Impact of non-smoking ordinances on hospitality revenues: The case of Germany regression and difference-in-difference strategies, we find negative impact limited to bars in the very short run. If any, there is a positive impact on total expenditures in the long run, indicating that either consumption pattern has not changed at all or that any reduction in spending by smokers is compensated for by a corresponding increase by non-smokers. These findings support the German -and similar -non-smoking legislations in the sense that positive externalities resulting from reduced health care cost are likely to outweigh the risk to businesses in the hospitality sector, at least in the long run.
Introduction
Non-smoking ordinances for public spaces in general and bars and restaurants in particular are among the most frequently applied and controversially discussed public health initiatives worldwide. The rationale on which these ordinances has been built is straightforward -they aim at reducing the exposure of non-smokers to secondhand smoke and, hence, their susceptibility to respiratory and heart diseases, and ultimately a reduction in health care costs. This argument applies to bar and restaurant visitors and particularly to employees, who might be less free in choice than customers or patrons. Furthermore, the empirical literature suggests smoking bans to reduce the overall consumption of tobacco products (PAK- KO, 2006) , which cause significant social costs estimated at 0.1%-1.1% of GDP (LIGHTWOOD et al., 2000) . In contrast to increasing taxation of tobacco products, * We thank Johannes Rothmaler for excellent research assistance.
HCED 26 -Impact of Non-smoking Ordinances on Hospitality Revenues 2 the impact of smoking bans cannot be neutralized by an increase in smuggling of tobacco products. In terms of traditional welfare economics, this argument is sometimes questioned since, in principle, and given the respective demand from non-smokers, markets should be able to provide smoke-free spaces in bars and restaurants without the intervention of the state. Critics of non-smoking ordinances argue that undesirable loss of choice will result in reduced bar and restaurant revenues. This criticism implies the assumption that the decrease in expenditure of smokers would be greater than the increase in expenditure of nonsmokers. However, this is a purely empirical issue and can hardly be affirmed on the basis of existing empirical evidence concentrated on the U.S.
1 To our knowledge, this study is the first multivariate empirical analysis of economic impact of a non-smoking ordinance in Europe.
We extend the literature on the impact of (non- panel approach, we distinguish between short-run and long-run impact, which may run in opposite directions. We exploit the fact that the new legislation was introduced by states at different dates as a key feature of our analysis. This particularity facilitates the first application of a quasi-experimental difference-indifference (DD) strategy in the realm of smoking ban literature, allowing for more efficient control for macroeconomic conditions compared to previous studies.
Background

Literature Survey
The economic impact of non-smoking ordinances on the gastronomy, mainly in the U.S., has been investigated on the basis of survey data (ADDA, BERLINSKI, & MACHIN, 2007; DUNHAM & MARLOW, 2000 , 2003 as well as official statistics. COTTI, 2007; ALPERT et al., 2007; THOMPSON et al., 2008) . Less common indicators include purchasing prices of restaurants (ALAMAR & GLANTZ, 2004 ) tourism demand (GLANTZ & CHARLESWORTH, 1999) or non-economic indicators like air quality (ALPERT et al., 2007) . SCOLLO & LAL (2008) provide an extensive survey on these strands of research.
In this analysis we make use bar and restaurant revenues, which have also been frequently employed in the literature. Only few of the newer studies, however, reveal a significantly negative impact of non-smoking ordinance on bar and restaurant revenues, 2 among these PAKKO (2007) rants."). In Saarland, the Protection of Non-Smokers Act continues to apply unchanged, which provides for exceptions for micro-enterprises and also allows for smoking rooms in discothèques. The respective state regulations are shown in Table A1 (see appendix).
Empirical Analyses
Throughout our empirical analyses we investigate the evolution of per capita revenues (RPC it ) in the hospitality sector at the levels of months (t) and German for a significant percentage impact on the revenues of the smoking ban legislation. As a control for macroeconomic conditions, which affect income levels and willingness to spend money in bars or restaurants, we add the rate of unemployment (unemp it ). Potential seasonality is accounted for by a set of quarterly dummy variables (SD t ). Our final specification, allowing for level shifts as well as a linear spline, reads as follows:
where ban it is a dummy variable indicating whenever a smoking ban was in operation in state i; trend t is a quarterly trend variable starting at the beginning of our observation period; and strend it is a trend variable similar to trend t that starts at the time the smoking ban was put into operation in state i. 3 Parameters a, α, and β as well as γ 1 and γ 2 are the coefficients to be estimated while ε it is a random error term component. Serial autorcorrelation, which we detected using the Lagrange multiplier (LM) test for serial correlation in a fixed effects model (BALTAGI, 2001, pp. 94-95) 4 is addressed by clustering standard errors at the state level (BERTRAND, DUFLO, & MULLAINATHAN, 2004) . In the present specification, the percentage impact on revenues in the first month of a smoking ban being in operation can be inferred from coefficient γ 1 . 5 In contrast, γ 2 is the percentage change in revenues after the first month of operation, conditional on other factors, and can indicate either an effect of recovery, amplification or persistency. A number of alterations to specification (1) are tested using either per capita revenues of the total hospitality sector (Table 1) or per capita revenues of bars (Table   2 ) and restaurants (Table 3) as an endogenous variable. The LM test statistic is / 1 / ; asymptotically distributed as N(0,1).
5
According to the standard interpretation of a semi-log model, the percentage impact corresponds to exp(b-1) x 100, where b is the estimated coefficient value (HALVORSEN & PALMQUIST, 1980) .
At the first stage of the empirical analysis we consider a reduced model specification where the interactive term ban it × strend it is omitted. This specification provides a test for a significant shift in average per capita revenues between the periods prior to and after implementation of the smoking ban (columns 1). No significant impact on revenues is evident from the results.
Therefore, we modify the column (1) specification to facilitate separate estimates on short-run (at three months) and long-run impact (after three months) (columns 2). Similarly, in columns (3) we distinguish between periods when a rigid or more attenuated (non-)smoking legislation was in operation, following the decision of the Federal Constitutional Court (BVerfG). On the basis of the coefficient estimates on the dummy variables sban it (short-run effect), lban it (longrun effect), rban it (rigid ban) and wban it (weak ban) displayed in columns (2) and (3), we cannot reject that the smoking ban had no impact on the per capita consumption in the hospitality sector. If any, there are signs of a small increase in per capita bar revenues of about 3.8% three months after smoking ban implementation, indicated by the weakly significant coefficient on lban it in Table   2 . No significant effects are found for restaurant revenues.
It might be argued that consumer behavior changes gradually since expectation of the benefit from going out are not adjusted for immediately. In the next step, we therefore turn our attention to whether there is evidence for a significant impact on trends in revenues. Building on specification (1) and omitting ban it , the column (4) specification tests for a linear spline occurring in the evolution of per capita revenues after implementation of the new legislation. Empirical results, again, do not allow rejection of the hypothesis of no impact on revenues. Finally, we estimate specification (1) which allows both for a level shift that accounts for an immediate reaction as well as a trend impact capturing gradual adjustment processes. Potentially, this specification may isolate opposing short-and long-run influences, i.e. a negative impact in the short-run, accompanied by a subsequent recovery effect. Indeed, we find a significantly positive impact on total per capita revenues of 0.5% per month while the coefficient on the short-run intercept (ban it ) is not statistically significant at conventional levels. For restaurants and HCED 26 -Impact of Non-smoking Ordinances on Hospitality Revenues 8 bars individually, no significant impact can be asserted, even on the basis of this quite flexible specification.
Notably, a significant downward trend is found in per capita consumption, accompanied by the expected negative impact of the rate of unemployment. Seasonality effects are similarly in line with expectations, pointing to significantly reduced (increased) per capita revenues in the winter (summer) months of roughly 10% (Table 1) . While these results are similarly obtained for restaurant revenues (Table 3) , per capita bar revenues are less influenced by long-run trend, macroeconomic conditions and the summer spending effect.
Tab. 1 Impact on Per Capita Bar and Restaurant Revenues
(1) Notes: The endogenous variable is the log of the per capita restaurant revenues in all models. All models include state (Bundesländer) effects. Standard errors are robust for heteroscedasticity and clustered at the state (Bundesländer) level. *, ** and *** denote significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively.
The federal states did not put into operation smoking bans at the same time. states where no similar intervention occurred. The unaffected states may serve as a control group in a quasi-experimental research strategy. We use simple DD specification to estimate our coefficients of interest, i.e. γ 1 and γ 2 . The DD specification is derived from specification (1) by taking differences and substituting the macroeconomic controls (quarterly dummies and unemp it ) by a full set of monthly time effects d t . 6 Coefficients γ 1 and γ 2 in equation (2) provide DD estimates in the sense that they differentiate the evolution of per capita revenues both between groups (affected and not-affected by smoking legislation) and time (prior to and after the intervention). Besides adjusting flexibly to macroeconomic conditions, this specification features the possibility of allowing the intervention to occur at different points in time within different states. Since after 1 January 2008, smoking bans were in operation in all states we omit this period from the sample in the respective estimates. Compared to specification (1), the DD estimator is more promising in identifying short-run impacts, due to better macroeconomic control, while the reduced post intervention period complicates inference on long-run trend impacts.
log log
Results corresponding to equation (2) are presented in Table 4 for total revenues (columns 1 and 4) as well as revenues of bars (columns 2 and 5) and restaurants (columns 3 and 6). All but coefficient γ 1 in the case of bar revenues remain statistically insignificant at conventional levels.
As shown by FLECK & HANSSEN (2008) , it is crucial to control appropriately for trends in order to precisely assess the intervention effect of smoking bans to avoid spurious evidence. Since there is the possibility of trends not being homogenous across states, we re-estimate equation (2) in a (state) fixed effects model, which in time-difference form captures trend effects at the state level (Table 4 , columns 3-6). Results, however, remain almost unchanged, again pointing to a significantly negative impact on per capita consumption in bars of approximately 6%. Since the respective coefficients on γ 2 are insignificant, we cannot reject persistency of the effect during the months following the implementation of the smoking ban. We note that our estimated short-run 6 Similar DD specifications that regress the growth rate of the endogenous variable on a full set of time effects and interaction dummies have recently been employed by AHLFELDT & REDDING & STURM (2008 conditions, instead point to a significantly negative short-run impact on the revenues of bars but not restaurants. In sum, our results draw a picture of limited negative short-run impact, followed by a recovery effect. Over the course of our study period, the consumption pattern either did not change at all or reduced 7
Comparing the reduction in revenues in the third quarter of 2007 to that of the previous year, the statistical office finds a 9.8% reduction in states which introduced smoking bans compared to a 6.8% reduction in states without smoking-ban legislation.
spending by smokers was compensated for by a corresponding or more than corresponding increase by non-smokers. These findings support the German -and similar -non-smoking legislations in the sense that positive externalities resulting from initiatives to reduce health care cost are likely to outweigh the risk to businesses in the hospitality sector, at least in the long run. 
